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CHAPTER ONE
LBADERSHIP AT THE ONSET OF' THE CIVIL WAR
The southern state of South Carolina seceded from the
Union in December 1860, after the election of Abraham Lincoln
to the presidency of the United States. By February 1861, she
was joined by six other states; later four more followed,
making eleven in all. Their total population was about nine
million, while that of the twenty-three states remaining loyal
to the Union was something over twenty million. 1
Fort Sumter, built in a routine way to adorn the coast
of a country that never expected to go to war, stood at the
precise spot where the hurricane was going to break. 2
At daybreak on the morning of April 12, 1861, General
P. G. T. Beauregard began open hostilities by firing on Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor. It is interesting to note that
Jefferson Davis might have sent a cargo of provisions to Fort
Sumter and invited its garrison to remain as guests of the
Confederacy. Had he done this he might have won the sympathy
1 Colin R. Ballard: The Militar
1952. Oxford University ~P-r_e_s_s_........L~o--n~d~o-n-.~.,..,,..~~~~~.,..,-----,..-------..........hereafter as Ballard.
2

Bruce Catton:This Hallowed Ground. 1956. Doubleday and
Co., Inc. Garden City, New York. p. i4. Cited hereafter as
Catton, This Hallowed Ground.

2

of many pacifists in the North.

His act would have kept him

right in the eyes of foreigners, and most certainly it would
I

~ave embarrassed Lincoln, who could neither withdraw his
garrison nor leave it there under such conditions.3
Thus it came that Lincoln, who of all men hated war, was
the one man on whose shoulders fell the responsibility for
conducting the greatest civil war known.

Called to the head

of our nation in the hour of crisis, Lincoln had neither
experience in administration nor any idea of military strategy,
yet he was forced to assume control of both.4 Ignorant of war,
he wanted to use the knowledge of one who was supposed to be
a master of the art.

President Lincoln approached General

Winfield Scott, the ancient warrior, with grateful humility.
He requested a daily report of the military situation.

Scott

started sending the reports immediately and continued to do
so for weeks. 5
Thus it was General Scott who becSll'le the first head of
the army for the Union cause in 1861.

This army at the out-

break of hostilities numbered about 16,000 men.

Of the 1200

officers that had been trained at West Point, about one third
were Southerners, and, with few exceptions, loyally supported
the South.

With so few qualified officers available, Lincoln

3Ballard, pp. 28-29.
4Ballard, pp. 33-36.
5T. Harry Williams: Lincoln~ His Generals. 1952.
Alfred A. Knopf. New York. p. 15. Cited hereafter as Willia.ms.
6Ballard, p. 46.

3
necessarily made numerous ooli ti cal apoointments to am.bi tious
political chieftains with large personal followings, especially
if they were Democrats.

Among these were John A. Logan, Nathaniel

B. Banks, John A. McClernand, and good ole Ben Butler.

These

selections saddled the army with some prize incompetents in
high places, but they were good investments in national
cohesion.7
General Scott was old and nearly senile; he was too fat
and infirm to mount a horse or even to review his troops.

All

he could offer the government was his great reputation and his
stout old heart.8 However, the general was able enough to see
the overall aspect of the war and the importance of the occupation of the Mississippi line.

.uosition

He suggested that a defensive

should be established around Washington while the

main effort was made in the West.9 Of General Scott's tenure
as military chief, one good thing can be said.

Upon his recommen-

dation Henry W. Halleck was appointed directly a Major General
and assigned to the department of the Missouri.

In July 1862,

he was promoted to general-in-chief of the armies of the United
States.

At that time he we.s transrerred to Wash1ngton where he

directed the movements of the generals in the field.

He was

71,villiams, p. 11.
BBruce Catton: Mr. Lincoln's Armv. 1951. Doubleday and
Co., Inc. Garden City';-New York. ;-:--1.;o. Cited hereafte.r> 8S
Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army.
cBallard, p. 175.

4
superseded by the appointment of General Grant in March 1864.lO
The fighting had hardly started, yet the most momentous
single decision had already been made.

As far as the Federal

government was concerned, it was to be a war to the finish.
The Lincoln administration made this decision.
enough the

<:'-:Jl1!'t.rv at

Interestingly

large accepted it, instinctively and

without stoooing to reason about it.

Of all the misunder-

standings that ~roduced the war, no single one had more tragic
consequences than the fact that th?~~~ of the South had completely failed to realize how deAnly the concept of nationality
had ta.ken root in the North.11
General Irvin McDowell was appointed as field commander
under General Scott.

Although powerful political figures had

suggested McDowell as commander, the reasons for his appoint~
ment were military.

However, the new general was to enter a

career which ended in tragedy.
Around Washington the· government was assembling an army
made up mostly of volunteers that numbered slightly over
30,000 by early summer.

Neither General Scott nor General

McDowell had any idea of sending this green army into battle
during the summer and fall of 1861.
with dif'ficulties which were real.

McDowell was oppressed
His command of' an army over

30,000 gave him the distinction of being the first general in

our country's history to hold such a position.12
10Dictionary of' American Biography. 1932. v-8. pp. 151-152.
Charleo Scribner's Sons. New York.
11 catton, ~ Hallowed Ground. pp. J5-J6.
12
Williams, p. 18.

5
Yet McDowell had no choice but to fight.

Lincoln and his

cabinet, as political authorities yielding to the country's
demands and considering that the time of the three-month troops
was about to expire, overruled Scott and McDoweli. 1 3 Late in
June, Scott, at the insistence of the President, gave McDowell
verbal instructions to prepare a plan of action against the
Confederate army at Manassas.
McDowell brought a plan to General Scott, and the two
worked it over carefully.

Scott approved the plan and on June

29th presented it to Lincoln.
·put his plan into execution.

Lincoln directed McDowell to
General Scott, however, was in

favor of waiting until a larger and better trained and prepared
army could win victories that would be decisive .J4 He knew that

General Beauregard had 21,000 Confederate soldiers at Manassas
Junction.

Also another Confederate army was training under

Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley.

Plans were for

a Union army under Robert Patterson, also in the Valley, to

prevent Johnston's troops from joining Beauregard.15
On Jt:ly 16, 1861, McDowell started an advance of 27 miles
to Manassas in response to the popular demand that the Federal
Government force a battle in Virginia.

General Beauregard fell

12Williams, p. 18.
13 Carl Sandburg: Abraham Lincoln, The
· War Years. 4-v.
1939. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York:-V-r:-pp. 35-36. Cited
hereafter as Sandburg, The:!:!!£. Years.
14w1111ams, pp. 19 -~~1 •
1 5sandburg, Th w
l p. 301.
~ .:...!£_ y ears. v-.

6

back and prepared for battle along the rough and wooded banks
of the Bull Run, a tributary of the Potomac.16 On July 21st
McDowell's troops began the fi.rhr.:in.&1; by driving the Confederates
from their position and then from one position to another;
finally the Confederates formed a line that held, and with the
aid of ,'.'<".i.nforcements which had arrived from the Valley they
were able to counterattack.

ThiB counterattack completely routed

the Union forces and started a wave or panic that did not
subside 1mti.l the men reached the fortifications surrounding
Washington.17 Had it not been for the arrival or fresh troops
• from the Shenandoah Valley and the exhaustion of the Union
troops, McDowell could conceive.bly have won the battle.
Actually about 18,000 men had been engaged on each side.

The

North had 460 killed and 1124 wounded while the South had 387
killed and 1582 wounded.18
As battles or the Civil War
very small one.

go:,

Manassas Junction was a

However, it did serve as a warning to the

North that the war would not be easily won.

It was now

apparent that the South would not give up without a struggle
to the last man, and that is almost what happenect.19
The people who had been loudest in clamoring tor an
16 Benjamin P. Thomas: Abraham Lincoln. 1952. Alfred A.
Knopf. New York. p. 271. Cited herearter as Thomas.
1 7Tyler Dennett: Lincoln and the Civil War. In the Diaries
and Letters of John Hay. Dodd,"rfEiad & Co. New°'Y'ork. Fn. p. 24
18

Ballard, pp. 51-53.
19
My conjecture.

7

advance on Richmond now realized the importance of the warnings of Generals Scott and McDowell:

the Government had sent

half-trained boys on an impossible task; the results were,
of course, disaster, a bad case of political disregard of
professional advice.20
Old General Scott had a clear eye.

Others could talk

about the one swift blow that would end the rebellion, but
he saw it differently.

The Confederacy, he believed, would

never be subdued piecemeal; it would have to be enveloped
and throttled.
"Let the navy (said Scott) blockade the southern coast.
The army, then, must drive down the Mississippi, open the
river all the way to the Gulf, split the western states from
the Confederacy and hold the Valley in such strength that the
blockade of the Southland would be complete.

With rebellion

isolated, it could then be crushed at leisure. 11 21
Scott's proposal was discussed at the White House, and
became known as the KAnaconda Plan".

It attempted to point

out what was necessary be.fore a really ef.fective war could
be waged.

Although scoffed at, Scott's plan took root in the

mind of Abraham Lincoln.

In the end, the Anaconda idea became

the basis for the Federal war effort.22
20Ballard, p. 54.
2 lcatton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 52.

22catton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 52.

8

Before making new plans Lincoln had to find a fresh army.
There was, however, little difficulty in this since recruits

came in faster than they could be trained.
one of organization.

The problem was

For this task Lincoln sought the help

of one George B. McClellan, a rising young General from
Ohio, who took command of the troops around Washington on
July 27, 1861.

By early fall 1861, there were some 170,000

men in the Union army, all well-trained and equipped.
time had come to consider new plans.

The

It was at this point

that Lincoln crone to the full realization that McDowell's
job was too large for him to handle.

At the same time he

was probably beginning to have some doubts about General
Scott too.23
Thus it became General McDowell's destiny to be the
first of a long line of Generals to be entrusted with the
reins of command and later be demoted or relieved of duties
altogether.

Lincoln's search for a general had now begun.24

2 3Williams, p. 23.
24My conjecture.

CHAPTER TWO
GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN
McClellan is the most controversial military figure of
the Civil War; after ninety-four years, the controversy still
rages.

Lee is quoted as having characterized McClellan as

the ablest of his opponents.l That McClellan was an able
organizer, a close student of war, and beloved by his troops,
few will deny.

On the other hand his timidity, vacillation,

procrastination and sensitiveness, his persecution mania, his
arrogance toward Lincoln, and his monumental egotism suggest
a psychopathic personality.2
"Little Mac", or the "Young Napoleon", as he was f'avorably
called by his troops, was below medium height but muscularly
compact, with red hair, red mustache, and an authoritative
manner.3 McClellan was extremely careful of the welfare of
his men, and his almost tender carefulness of their lives
contrasted afterwards with what appeared the ruthless carelessness oi' Grant .4

lDouglas Southall Freeman: R. E. Lee. 4v.
Scribner's Sons. New York. 1947. v. 4. p. 475.

Charles

2Henry s. Commanger: ~ Blue and The Gray:. 2v. 1950.
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. New York. v. 1. p. 193. Cited
hereafter as Commanger.
3Thomas, p. 284.
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He was thirty-five when the war started.

A West Point

graduate, he had done well in the Mexican War, and later he
was sent to the Crimea by the War Department to watch the
British and French fight the Russians.

Then with the rank of

captain, he had resigned from the army to go into business.
A capable engineer, by the spring of 1861 he had become
president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad at ten-thousanddollars-a-year, and was working and living in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The War reached out for him without delay.5

In mid-April 1861, McClellan, who was a Pennsylvanian by
birth, had received a message from Governor Andrew G. Curtin of
Pennsylvania, inviting him to come to Harrisburg at once and
take charge of the Pennsylvania troops.

On his way to Harrisburg

he stopped off at Columbus to advise the Governor of Ohio.
This stopover made all the difference.
The Governor explained what he was up against.

He had what

looked like the impossible job of getting ten thousand men
ready for the field, and there was no one around who knew the
first thing about the military arts.

Under these circumstances

the Governor had no intentions of letting a good West Pointer
slip through his fingers, and he then and there offered McClellan
the command of the Ohio troops.

McClellan accepted, moved into

4Lord Charnwood: Abraham Lincoln. 1917. Garden City
Publishing Co. Garden City, New York. p. 285. Cited hereafter
as Charnwood.
Scatton, Mr. Lincoln's Army.

p.

56

11

an office in the state house, and got down to work, a majorgeneral of volunteers.6
As soon as the Ohio regiments were mustered into the
United States service, McClellan found himself holding one of
the key jobs in the whole army.

Ohio was on the frontier.

The

western part of Virginia was just across the river and the
Confederates had sent troops deep into the mountains.

It was

correctly supposed in Washington that this part of Virginia
was strongly Unionist and it seemed important to drive them out.
By the end of May, McClellan found himself commanding a
small force of sizteen regL~ents from Ohio, nine from Indiana,
and two from Virginia.

He moved up into the mountains, found

two Confederate detachments drawn up in the passes, attacked
one and caved it in, causing the other to retreat, and then
moved on to the town of Beverly, taking prisoners and securing
everything west of the Alleghenies for the Union, and making
possible the eventual formation of the state of West Virginia.?
It had been neatly done; it was the North's first feat of
arms and the country rejoiced at the news.

The "annihilation",

as he termed his victory in his dispatches, consisted in the
retreat of the opposing forces and the loss by it of about a
thousand men.

Just before the battle McClellan issued a very

egotistic statement to his troops which reads:
have heard that there was danger here.

6catton, ~. Lincoln's Army.
7catton,

1'1t· Lincoln's Army.

I have come to place

P• 57.
p.

"Soldiers!

58.

I

12
myself at your head and share it with you.

I fear now but one

thing--tha t you will not find foemen worthy of your steel.

I

know that I can count on you. n8
This sort of thing went over big with t:p.e country at large,
and just then, before anybody had forgotten about it, the news

came in about the humiliating disaster to McDowell at Bull Run.
So it was, that with very little actual military achievement
to his credit, McClellan was called to Washington on July 27,

1861, to be given the command of the Army of the Potomac which
was in the process of reorganization.
"He found Washington overrun with men in unii'orm who
drifted about the streets (and jammed the saloons) in aimless
confusion.

He detailed regular army soldiers to police the

place, got the wanderers back into camp, saw that the camps
were properly laid out, ironed out the kinks in the commissary
system so that everyone got plenty to eat, and in short,
restored order."9
He was in the process of creating an army, and it had a
name, a name that would cast long shadows and stir great
memories before the end came--the Army of the Potomac.

More

often, though, the newspapers spoke of i t simply as "McClellan I s
Army", and that was the way the men themselves thought of it.
They were McClellan's men, and in spirit most of them would
continue to be that as long as they lived.10

Scatton,!'.!!:.· Lincoln's Army. p. 59.
9catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 53.
lOCatton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 53-54.

13

In his campaign in western Virginia, McClellan revealed
most of the military and personal characteristics he would
later manifest in his operation with a larger command.

His

preparations for battle were confident and energetic, but as
the time came for action he became slow and timid.
During the sUlllil1er and early fall, McClellan forged from
the multitudes of volunteers placed at his command the Army
of the Potomac, one of the finest fighting armies in the
history of war.

Whatever else he failed to do in the war, he

created that army, and gave it a belief in itself that nothing
could destroy.

For this job Lincoln could not have picked a

better man to reorganize McDowell's defeated troops.11
Upon arrival in Washington, McClellan soon came to the
realization that old General Scott was more of a hindrance
than a help.

Undeniably Scott was an obstacle--a querulous

fuss-budget--his greatness only a memory.

The job could not

be done unless a way could be found around the old gentleman.
McClellan started to ignore and bypass the General-in-chief,
communicating directly with Lincoln and the members of the
cabinet.12
General Scott, finally realizing that he was being pushed
into the background by an "Ambitious Junior 11 , wrote a form.al
application requesting that he be placed on the retired list.
On November 1, 1861, Lincoln accepted Scott's request and
11Williams, p. 29.
12Williams, p. 32.

f
placed McClellan in command of

11

the wbo le army 11 • 13

From the battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, to March

5,

1862, the Southern army, under Genera.l Joseph E. Johnston, lay
quietly drilling at Manasses.
On April 2, 1862, McClellan started the celebrated
Peninsula campaign.

The movement of 100,000 men by water

demanded a large number of ships, and the business of collecting them was begun in Februa.ry.
was very slow,

The progress up the Peninsula

He had not informed himself correctly as to the

geography and the number of troops opposing him in Johnston 1 s
army.

On May 31, nearly two months after arrival, Johnston

attacked at a disadvantage and was defeated.

A part of the

army pursued the enemy to within four miles of Richmond, and

had McClellan acted with energy he could have.taken the city.
The delay gave the enemy time to strengthen themselves in men
and fortifications.

During this engagement General Johnston

was wounded and replaced as commander by the inspired Lee.14
By now other things were going wrong, most of them growing
out of a bitter difference of opinion between General McClellan
and the Lincoln administration,

A disagreement between a General and the government could
have odd potentialities this spring of 1862.
the Democratic position.

McClellan embodied

Any military program he might adopt

could be considered a Democratic program, and it was all tooeasy
1 3w111iama, p,

43.

14charnwood, pp. 294-297.

15
to consider a Democratic program as "rebellious" at this time.
Basicly the difference of opinion reflected divergent
ideas on the kind of war the country was fighting.

The admin-

istration had accepted it from the first as a revolutionary
struggle, calling for hard blows struck quickly; McClellan always
saw it as a traditional war-between-gentlemen affair, the sort
in which a professional soldier could play straight.

The

administration wanted relentless combat but lacked military
knowledge; McClellan had military knowledge but could not
see that fund8lllentally this was a political war.

It was

becoming very hard for McClellan and Lincoln to agree about
anything whatsoever.15
McClellan was slowly but surely inching his way toward
Richmond during the month of June, 1862.

From June 26 to July 2

there took place a series of engagements known as the Seven

Days' Battle, in which the Union army was forced to retreat to
a place known as Harrison's Landing. From this position of
security, the army was slowly withdrawn and added to the forces
of General John Pope and the Army of Virginia.16
Meanwhile, Lincoln had appointed General Henry Halleck
commander of all armies, the vacancy being caused by the absence
of McClellan when he went to the Peninsula.

During the time

of the Peninsula campaign there were several small forces
of Union soldiers in and around Washington and the Shenandoah

l5catton, This Hallowed Ground.
16 Charnwood, pp. 297-299.

pp. 132-133.

16
Valley, one of these a force of some 35-40,000 men under
General McDowell.

While the main part of the army was on

the Peninsula it became necessary to appoint an overall commander of these forces.

Upon the recommendation of General

Halleck and in view of his success in the West, General
John Pope was given the responsibility of organizing these
scattered detachments into a fighting unit.17
Major General John Pope was an odd figure.

Postmaster

General Montgomery Blair had once remarked venomously ~hat he
was a cheat and a liar like all the rest of his tribe.

While

a disgruntled Blair was apt to be harsh in his judgment, Pope
did have a pronounced ability to irritate people.
The War Department brought Pope east in a well-meant
effort to inject a little vigor into the Virginia campaign.
Some 50,000 troops were turned over to him, including those
of McDowell.

He was told to weld them into an army and go

down and fight General Lee and his Confederate army.
Pope began moving down the line of the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad, preparing to descend on Richmond from the northwest,
while McClellan's presence on the James forced the city's defenders to look toward the southeast.

McClellan remained in his

camp, making no offensive gestures, and Lee presently concluded
that it would be safe to send Stonewall Jackson to look after
Pope.18

'-7Thomas, pp. 335-336.
18catton, This Hallowed Ground.

pp. 153-154..

17
Lee divided his army, sent Jackson on a wide swing to
sever the Union communications and capture the supply depot
at Manassas.

After wreaking havoc behind the Northern lines,

Jackson retreated northwest, fighting off pursuers in order to
give Lee time to join him,

On August 29, Pope caught up with

Jackson near the old battle field of Bull Run.

Pope then launched

a series of costly attacks against a railroad embankment sheltering Jackson's troops.

Instead of attacking, he should have been

seeking a position for defense, for General Longstreet had
circled west and was now massed on Pope's left flank.

Pope

simply could not believe that any of Lee's troops had had time
to catch up with him and he ordered an all out attack, which
was repulsed with heavy loss,
After this heavy defeat at Second Bull Run, Pope surmised
that his position was worse than it was.

He gave up hope before

he needed to and asked to be drawn into the defenses around
Washington.19
It was very clear that neither the army nor public opinion
would tolerate Pope after the fiasco of Se~ond Bull Run in
Which an army of 90,000 had been routed by 55,000 Confederates.
On September

5,

Lincoln relieved him of command, and over

vigorous opposition from his Cabinet, reappointed McClellan to
CO!llilland of the now reunited Army of the Potomac.

Lincoln was,

however, determined that McClellan's command should be temporary
because he believed the General incapable of offensive warfare.

19Thomas, p~. 336-338.

18
A victory was needed for more reasons than one.

Overseas

the British Government seemed to be on the verge of recognizing
the Confederacy as an independent nation--an act that would
almost certainly bring effects as far-reaching and decisive as
the French recognition of the American colonies had brought in

1778.

The British Prime Minister and Cabinet seemed at last ready

to take the step.

They would wait, however, a little while
longer to see whet came of Lee's invasion of the North. 20
Washington was now too strongly held to be attacked, but
T.ee determined to invade Maryland.

At least this would keep

Virginia safe d~ring harvest time; his footsore troops might
find new shoes in small-town stores; and the coming of his
army might win him many recruits in slaveholding Maryland.
All of this occured just as Abraham Lincoln was preparing
to issue a proclamation of emancipation for Negro slaves.
had made up his mind during the summer.

He

The base of the war

would have to be broadened and an immeasurable new force would
have to be injected into it.

It would become now a social

revolution, and there was no way to foretell the final consequences.

At the very beginning Lincoln had accepted secession

as a variety of revolution and had unhesitatingly used revolutionary measures to meet it; however, he clung tenaciously to
the idea that the one ruling war aim was to restore the Union.
Re had steered carefully away from steps that would destroy the
whole social fabric of the South.

But it could not be done that

20catton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 158.

19
way.

Come what might, Lincoln would free the slaves, as far as

the stroke of a pen on a sheet of paper could,21
As Lee moved northward, the army of the Potomac hovered
on his right flank, safeguarding Washington.

On September 13,

1862, Lee's entire plan of operation fell into McClellan's
hands when an Indiana private found a copy of an order wrapped
around three cigars.

Lee was dividing his forces, sending

Jackson to Harper's Ferry in order to protect his communications,
while the remainder of his troops moved toward Hagerstown where
he could threaten Harrisburg and other Pennsylvania towns.
With Lee's army widely dispersed, here was a chance to destroy
it in detail.

McClellan moved with unaccustomed speed for

him, but still with extreme caution.

With some 100,000 troops

at his disposal, he thought Lee, whose whole strength did
not a.mount to 50,000, must surely outnumber him.22
The Army of the Potomac caught up with Lee and Jackson
near the town of Sharpsburg, Maryland, which lies close to a
small stream called the Antietam.

There on September 17 and 18,

1862, McClellan ordered an attack, to which he did not attempt
to give his personal direction.

His corps commanders led

assaults on Lee's position at different times and in so disconnected a manner that each was repulsed singly,
effect was demoralizing to the Southerners.

The overall

Had McClellan

ordered one more attack and sent in the units he was holding in

2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground.
22Thomas, pp. 339-340,

pp. 157-158,

20

reserve in case they were needed for a possible rear guard
action, he would have utterly swept Lee's army from the field.23
McClellan was at the crisis of his career and he fumbled the
moment completely.
Lee's men had taken a dreadful pounding.

They had suffered

astounding losses (more than ten thousand men between dawn
and dusk--a good fourth of all the men he had on the field)
but they had not q'.1i te been driven from Sharpsburg and the
high ground.

By every dictate of military logic, Lee would

have to cross the Potomac and get back to Virginia as soon as
darkness came.

But Lee did not retreat.

With fewer than

thirty thousand infantrymen in his command, he calmly waited
all day September 18 for McClellan to renew the fighting.

(Of

all the daring gamblers who ever wore an American military
uniform, Lee unquestionably was the coolest.)

Ria bluff worked,

for McClellan pondered and waited for reinforcements and
tomorrow, which never came.

Lee ordered a retreat that night.

Even McClellan was likely to attack if he was given time enough.24
Here was a victoryover Lee, indisputably, even if a negative one.

He had invaded the North with high hopes; he had

been compelled to fight along the Antietam, and after the fight
he had had to march back into Virginia.

At enormous cost the

army of the Potomac had won a strategic victory.

However quali-

fied this triumph might be, at least the invasion was over.
There would be a new campaign now, and it would take place south

23catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army. pp. 312-314.
24catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 168-169.
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of the Potomac.

McClellan was looking ahead to it.25

Lincoln had promised to decree emancipation by the first
of the new year.

On December 1, 1862, he sent a messa;e to

congress suggesting the adoption of a constitutional amendment
providing for gradual, fully-compensated emancipation all
across the land, in loyal states and in rebellious states alike.
"Geography, r, said Lincoln, "was controlling; there could
not be two nations here; the land itself would compel a reunion
even if the attempt at secession won.

Without slavery, the

effort to force a separation could not long continue.
meet the inevitable hal.fway?

Why not

Compensated emancipation would

not cost as much as the war itself' was costing; also it would
kill no young men.

To save their country, men must disenthrall

themselves from the dogmas of the past.

To ~ive freedom to

the slave was to preserve it !'or all others."26
With the Emancipation Proclamation Lincoln would change
the war, for himself as well as for everyone else.

The war

would now be pushed past settlement; the unconditional surrender which the government would always insist on would become
something that the Confederate leaders would not even consider.
In order that Lincoln might sign the Proclamation twenty-five
thousand Americans, North and South had been shot.27
Lincoln watched McClellan eagerly, and came to the

25ca tton, Mr. Lincoln's Army.
26catton, ~ Hallowed Ground.
2 7catton, ~ Hallowed Ground.

PP• 326-327.

p. 184.
PP• 170-172.
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Antietam to see things for himself.

He went back to Washington

in the full belief that McClellan would move at once.

To be

certain of this, Lincoln uttered a warning, and to avoid any
misunderstanding, followed it with a definite order.
order was dated October 5, 1862.
was dated November 5.

This

The one dismissing Mc·Clellan

It was very likely that Lincoln had fixed

in his own mind a time limit of one month as a test; he had a
habit of fixing beforehand the time for taking certain action.
If in that month McClellan fought a battle or made a real
attemp.t to force a battle on Lee, he would be retained in
command; if it was to be a repetition of the Peninsula-preparation for tomorrow, absolute disregard for orders--then he
must go .28
In the last analysis most of McClellan's difficulties
stemmed from his .failure to take Lincoln into his confidence,
as Grant later did.

Lincoln, a.fter much deliberation, arrived

at the opinion that McClellan was not f'it for command of' an
army intended f'or off'ensive operations.

This was an all-

sufficient reason for dismissing him.
On November 7, 1862, General Eurnside was called and
very reluctantly assumed command of the AI"fJJ.y of' the Potomac.
McClellan's

career was finished.

another assignment.29

28Ballard, p. 135.
2 9williarns, p. 177.

Never was he to receive

CHAPTER THREE
LINCOLN LOOKS IN VAIN FOR SOMEONE TO WIN A VICTORY
Lincoln, in his search for a general, wanted a man who
would make no fatal blunder.

He must also be a man of un-

daunted enterprise; while he did not wish to expose the North
to disaster he did mean to conquer the South.l
Events were to prove Lincoln's selection of General
Burnside a poor one, but to the desperate President he seemed
the best man available.

A graduate of West Point, thirty eight

years old, the new commander had a genial, pleasing manner and
an imposing presence, enhanced by lush side whiskers.

Having

twice rejected an offer of the command of the Army of the Potomac,
he assUI1J.ed it with great misgivings, as a duty.

An honest

conscientious soldier, mindful of his own limitations, he told
brother officers that he was not up to his job.

History bears

out the accuracy of his sel.:yc{ppraisal.2
The Army of the Potomac was at Warrenton, Virginia, just
south of Manassas Junction, when Burnside assumed command.

He

then proposed to strike straight south through Fredericksburg
for Richmond.

This plan would have succeeded ii' Burnside had

lCharnwood, p. 287.
2

Thomas, p. 348.

had the full co-operation of General Halleck, as the Confederates

under Longstreet were near Culpepper some thirty miles away
~d Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley.
Burnside's whole plan hinged on the arrival of enough
pontoons to construct three bridges across the Rappahannock

River at Fredericksburg.

While Burnside waited impatiently,

Lee collected his forces on the heights beyond the town.
Fredericksburg was deceptive.

The Rappahannock which

runs on an easterly course, turns south just above the town,
and for a distance flows very nearly on a north-south line,

with Fredericksburg lying on the west bank.

To the west of

the town there is a shallow open plain extending several miles
downstream.

Just beyond the plain lies a long chain of

wooded hills which approximately parallels the river.
looks innocent enough since the hills are not high.
south they trail off into gentle rolling country.

This
To the

But the

hills are just high enough to make an ideal defensive position.
Here on the crest Lee's army was securely posted.3
By the time the pontoon bridges were completed, Lee's
position was almost impregnable against a frontal attack.
was here that Burnside made his fatal mistake.

It

He failed to

make new plans after the original situation changed.

Even as

late as the day before the battle, Lee was still unable to
believe that the main assault was to be made here, and to the

3~atton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 188.
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1ast moment the Confederates thought that the crossing at
Fredericksburg must be a ponderous feint.4
Having committed himself to an advance here, Burnside
felt there was nothing left but to try the impossible, and
this he ordered the army to do, for there was a great stubbornness in him--a great stubbornness and nothing more.

He

had said he would cross at Frederi8ksburg, and at Fredericksburg he would cross, even if destruction awaited him, as it
most assuredly did.
11

In all the war no army moved up against a tougher

position than Burnside's army encountered here at Fredericksburg.

Without a miracle, the Confederate position here could

not be taken by storm. 11 5
The battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, can
be summed up with few words:
prepared position.

a frontal attack against a well-

Rarely has less maneuver or finesse been

seen in a general engagement.
The verdict of the battle was quite definite enough to
make another change in command necessary, and this was openly
voiced in the army itself.6

On January 24, 1863, Burnside,

feeling the growing resentment of his fellow officers, issued
an

ultimatum to President Lincoln that General Hooker and

4Bruce Catton: Glory Road, 1952. Doubleday and Co., Inc.
Garden City, New York. p. ~ Cited hereafter as Catton,
Glory Road,
5catton, This Hallowed Ground.
6 Ballard, p. 152.

pp. 187-188.
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several other staff officers be relieved from their duties.
This ultimatum was accompanied by Burnside's resignation and
stated in part that the President could accept the one that
was best for the army and the country.?
Lincoln dismissed Burnside, and--somewhat reluctantly,
as his letters reveal--appointed in his place "Fighting Joe"
Hooker, whom Burnside declared to be "unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present."

It was per-

haps the one time when Burnside I s judgment proved sound.
Joseph Hooker was a slim and handsome man, with rosy
cheeks and cold eyes, a hard-drinking, hard-living general
with some coarseness of fiber.

At his headquarters there

was a glitter of arrogance, and in his speech in the spring
of 1863 there was a contemptuous confidence in victory, a
glib preacceptance of triumph that might just possibly hide
a deep inner uncertainty.8
By the end of April 1863, Hooker had what he called "the
finest army on the planet."

Certainly it was the largest and

best equipped that had ever been seen in America.

Against

Hooker's force of some 130,000 men Lee could muster less than
60,.000, (for Longstreet's corps was miles away, south of the
James River).
Hooker, like Burnside, was another man who had a river to
cross--the Rappahannock.

He knew he could count on the troops,

for the Army of the Potomac had been tried and proven many
?Williams, pp. 205-206.
Scatton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 238.
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times.

They could do just about anything their commander want-

ed them to do if he could use them to their full potential.
The question mark was Joe Hooker.9
Hooker's strategy was admirable.

Leaving Sedgwick with

40,000 men at Fredericksburg, he planned to move up the Rappahannock, cross over through the wilderness, catch Lee in a
giant pincers movement, and overwhelm him.

By the end of April

Hooker had completed the reorganization of the army and except
for a reserve corps was across the Rappahannock and prepared
to move on Lee.
First Hooker sent General Stoneman off on a cavalry raid
designed to disorganize Lee's communications and threaten
Richmond.

When he moved up the river to Chancellorsville he

failed to catch Lee by surprise; when Slocum's corps moved
down the plank road toward Fredericksburg it ran into wellentrenched Confederate opposition.

Instead of giving battle,

Hooker mysteriously withdrew to Chancellorsville, thus giving
the initiative to Lee, who promptly seized and exploited it.
Once again Lee out-generaled his adversary, using Hooker's
own strategy.

Instead of being caught in a pincer, he caught

Hooker in a like maneuver, rolled him up on both flanks and
pushed him back to the edge of the river; then he turned on
the hapless Sedgwick and sent him hurtling back across the
river.lo

9catton, This Hallowed Ground.
10 commager, pp. 228-229.

p. 239.
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Hooker's sudden withdrawl can be partially explained.
Early in the battle he was wounded from the explosion of an
artillery shell and was in shock.

As a result he lost self-

control and presence of mind and took his losses to be greater
than they were, and drew his army back across the Rappahannock
to Chancellorsville.11
Chancellorsville was a dearly bought .victory.

Confeder-

ate casu,alt:i.es were 18,156, of which almost eleven thousand
were killed or wounded.

In some ways it was the most spectacular

victory of Lee's career, and yet this victory was sterile.

Not

only had it cost the Coni'ederacy more than it could afford to
pay

in men and materials, but it had been the final engage-

ment for Stonewall Jackson, who was literally irreplaceable.12
The rest of the spring the two armies faced each other
across the Rappahannock.

Then on June

broke camp and headed north.

5, 1863, Lee unexpectedly

Lincoln advised Hooker to follow

the Confederates on the inside of the curve, thus protecting
Washington and their lines of communication at all times.
By now the War Department's distrust of Hooker was solid.
Re was crippled by his failure at Chancellorsville and could
not take the initiative.

He, nor anyone else, could prevent

What was coming,13
As the Army of the Potomac moved northward, a long and
11 Charnwood, p. 311.
12 catton, .1'.hi! Hallowed Ground.
1 3catton, This Hallowed Ground.
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244,
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low burning animosity between Hooker and Halleck flared.

The

ison of· 10,000 men at Harper's
immediate i s sue Was a garr
Ferry.

Hooker wanted this force to join his main body.

On June

arently lost his temper and demanded that the
27, Hooker app
dispute be referred to the President, and without waiting for

a reply, followed his first tele~rP~ with another, offering
his resignation.14
Lincoln, whose own calm was unruffled even in his most
de.spondent moments, had been watching the symptoms, and when
the outbreak confirmed his suspicions, there was not the slightest hesitation in making up his mind.

That same night Meade

received orders to take up the connna.nd of the Army of the Potomac.15
Meade replaced Hooker on Jn-r:,:; 27, 1863, just three days
oei'ore the opening of the battle of Gettysburg.

This was un-

welcome ne.ws, fo.r the enlisted men still liked Hooker.

But if

mo,s,t of the_ soldiers felt that the government had made a mistake
in this change of commanders they kicked up no fuss over it.
The ard·ent hero worship of the old volunteer days was· gone now.

The heroes• had'. departed and the men themselves had lost their

o.ld need to make and worship heroes.

The man at the top might

be anybody; it no longer seemed to matter much.16
G.eneral. Meade was a Pennsylvanian forty-seven years old,

~omas, pp. 381-383.
l.5B'allard, p. 152.

I6c atton, Glory~.
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of good family, and very highly educated.

He had commanded a

division at Fredericksburg, where he was one of the few generals
who earned renown.

Tall and straight, he had an expression that

has been described as somewhat reserved but somewhat irritable.
He had none of the personality characteristics which had endeared McClellan to his men.
reliable soldier.

However, Meade was a thorough and

The victory at Gettysburg which followed six

days after his appointment, silenced any possible criticism
which might have been made about his selection, and consoli. dated his position.

He was to continue in command of the Army

of the Potomac till the end of the war.17
It was a critical situation which General Meade was called
upon to face when he took command at the end of June 1863.

A

Confederate army was on Northern soil, and the people of the
North were panic-stricken.

So intense was the criticism directed

against all officers of the Army of the Potomac, that when
handed his appointment as commander of that army General Meade
at first mistook it for an order for his arrest.18
In June 1863, General Lee had decided to carry the war
into the North by an invasion of Maryland end-Pennsylvania.
This, he thought, would strengthen the peace party of the North,
which was loudly demanding peace at any price.

It would also

give Virginia a chance to rest from the ravages of war, and if
successful it might win some of the European nations to rec1 7Ballard, pp. 164-165.
18williams, p. 260.
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0 gnize

the Confederacy as an independent nation.

seemed ripe for the undertaking.

not in good condition.

The time

The armies of the North were

The terms of the men had expired, and

Hooker was rendered ineffective by his defeat at Chancellorsville and General Meade was but newly appointed to fill the
vacancy•
For two weeks General Lee had carried all before him.
His troops had begun to cross the Potomac on June 15; they had
marched through Maryland, entered Pennsylvania, and were advancing upon Harrisburg, the capital of the Keystone State.

For a time the Northern leaders feared an attack on Washington,
but when it became evident that invasion of Pennsylvania was
Lee's object, Meade followed in hot pursuit.
nThe battle of' Gettysburg was more or less an act of' f'ate;
a: three-day storm of terror, unplanned and uncontrollable,

coming inevitably out of' the things hard-pressed men had done
in. light o.f imperfect knowledge, the end result o.f actions that

moved toward a fundamental goal •••• It was enormously destructive,
its significance was not seen until long a.fter it had ended,
and it opened and closed with moments of' heartbreaking drama. 11 19
Gettysburg was a dot on the map marking a place where all
the roads crossed; a pleasant little town lying a.mid rolling
hills and broad shallow valleys, a blue mountain wall rising
a score or more miles to the west.
nit had not been intended to deliver a general battle so

19
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far from the base unless attacked," wrot.e General Lee.

"But

coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw
through the mountains with our extensive trains would have
been difficult and dangerous. rr20

In a sense, the battle at

Gettysburg was an accident; neither Lee nor Meade wanted a
fight there, though once the fighting had begun Meade saw
the advantages of the terrain south of the town for defensive
fighting.
Advance parties of the Confederate and Union forces met
in conflict on July 1st.

Some of the Confederate cavalry were

on.their way to the village of Gettysburg to obtain shoes, as
there was a serious shortage among the rank and file and
numerous troops were barefooted.

There they met an advance

guard of Union cavalry and the battle was on.

On this first

day Lee did achieve some success and drove the northern troops
from the steep heights that form Seminary Ridge.

As all of this

was taking plac~ several urgent messages were sent and Federal
infantry began to arrive and give support to the action.

The

Southern forces were of sufficient number however, and continued
to press home their advantage and succeeded in driving their
adversaries out of the town and to the high ground just to the
south.

Here on Cemetery Ridge Meade made his stand.

By the evening of the first day the Federal troops who
were left were beginning to reassemble on this high ground,
grimly determined to hold on until the rest of the army came
20w· 11·
J.
J. a.ms , p. 264.
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up, but not at all sure they could do it.
It was possible that Lee could have gained a foothold
on Cemetery Ridge that evening, since most of his scattered
army was now on the scene.
outnumbered.

The Union forces were badly

One final assault in the old Stonewall Jackson

manner could conceivably have done it.

However, he was

fighting in the dark with most of his cavalry that might
have told him where all of Meade's men were, still absent.
And Jackson was in his grave.

By the time the Southern

generals had conferred, considered and weighed the risks,
it was too late.

The battle would have to be resumed the

next day.21
July second found most of both armies at the scene.
The day was made up of numerous separate attacks against
the Federal positions on either end of Cemetery Ridge.
Southern forces under General Richard Ewell tried to take
Culp's Hill on the northern end of the Union line.

They found

the federals posted in solid breastworks of earth and felled
trees.

They struggled up the hillside, stumbled back down and

tried again, won a foothold that threatened the Union army
with disaster--and could not quite make it, as the chain lightning of the flashing guns laced the Southern line relentlessly,22
At the southern end of the Union line, around the Peach
Orchard, the Confederate cause was a little more successful.

2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground.

p. 251.

22catton, This Hallowed Ground.
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Union General Dan Sickles posted his men on the Emmitsburg
road against orders.

Longstreet attacked Sickles at the

Peach Orchard amid an intense artillery bombardment.

There

was hand to hand fighting with bayonets and musket butts.
Sickles' corps was forced to give ground back to a high place
known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top, the southern
anchor of the Union line. 2 3
On July third Lee renewed his attack.

After a lull in the

fighting in the late morning a terrific cannonade began at
approximately 1:00 P.M.

This was supposed to soften the

Union lines for one final assault.

Meade surmised correctly

that the next big attack would be launched against the center
of his line since Lee had tried both ends of the Union position
without gaining any decisive advantage.
It is somewhat difficult to determine the exact time that
lapsed before the infantry lines of General Pickett were put
in motion after the artillery firing along Seminary Ridge
had ended.

The most conservative estimate is about one hour.

This time lapse gave the Union lines enough time to bring
up fresh guns from the artillery reserve and to mass fresh
divisions of infantry in rear of the front lines.

All this

being true, is there any doubt as to the cause for the
failure of General Lee's expectations?24

23catton,

This Hallowed Ground.
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The Union soldiers atop Cemetery Ridge saw an army
moving out from the woods into the open field by ranks.

Rank

upon endless rank were drawn up with parade-ground precision,
battle flags and all.

General George Pickett's Virginians and

ten thousand men from other commands were to begin his famous
charge. 25
Pickett's men were mowed down like grain.

Great gaps

appeared in their lines, but these were closed immediately.

Their

thinning ranks swept on until a small remnant, led by the gal.lant Armistead, crossed the Federal lines on the crest of
Cemetery Ridge,
briefly.

The Stars and Bars waved over the Union defenses

But the price had been great; the few who remained

could not hold what they had won.
threw down their arms and fled.

Attacked on all sides, they
Lee's great assault, one of

the most desperate charges in all history, had failed.26
Pickett's charge was the highwater mark of the Confederacy,

A total of 15,oaa Southern soldiers started across that

open wheat field which was one mile wide.
a

thousand made it back to their own lines.

A little more than
This was the

turning point of the war; never again would Lee have strength
enough to invade northern soil.27 Union forces had suffered
4,000 killed, 12,000 wounded, and 4,000 prisoners, about
20,000 in all.

The Rebels lost 5,500 killed, 21,000 wounded

and about 9,000 prisoners, also 4,000 stragglers for a total
25·catton, This Hallowed Ground,
2 6compton's, v-6. pp. 105-106.
2 7catton, Glory Road,

pp. 251-257.

pp. 337-334,

---

-

-

-----------------------

37
of about 40,000.

The battle of Gettysburg resulted in checking

the progress and then in destroying the power of a well-disciplined and defiant Southern army.28
General Meade had fought with great tactical skill.

He

placed his men well, and used his reserves ~roperly to bolster
threatened places in his lines.

However, he showed no aggress-

ive spirit, and was content to fight a completely defensive
battle. 2 9
At Gettysburg, as at Antietam, Lee was u.~willing to admit
defeat, but stood his ground defiantly the next day, awaiting
a Union attack.

Perhaps Meade should have attacked, but he had

suffered over 20,000 casualties and 15,000 desertions, and an
attack might have led to a bloody repulse.

On the afternoon of

the fourth, Lee started his long retreat to Virginia.

A heavy

rain set in swelling the Potomac; not until the night of the
thirteenth did Lee have his army on Confederate soil.30
Meade and the Federal army followed Lee with extreme
caution very much aware that the Confederate army was still as
dangerous as a wounded tiger.
to Virginia.

In the end both armies returned

Another Confederate invasion had been repulsed.31

It would be too much to say that certain victory was within Meade's reach after Gettysburg, for there is no such thing

28M. Jacobs: The Rebel Invasion of Maryland & Pennsylvania.
1864. J.B. Lippincott & Co. PP• 46-4"7':"
2 9Williams, p. 264.
30commager, p. 63R.
3 1 catton, This Hallowed Ground.
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as a certainty in war--but it is a fact that he had a better
chance then than ever presented itself to a Union commander
either before or afterward,

Lincoln, the amateur strategist,

grasped it at the time, while his professional soldiers were
congratulating themselves on "driving the invader from our
~oil, 11 32
With high water at his back to prevent Lee from crossing,
Meade was still unable to comprehend that the Confederates had
been badly beaten and were in no shape to resume the offensive.
Lincoln, on learning of Lee's escape to the south bank of the
Potomac, said "We had them within our grasp.

We had only to

stretch forth our hand and they were ours. 11 33
On the day after Gettysburg the southern fortress of
Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant.
news with deep but sober joy.

The North received the

It was then realized that these

two great events marked the turning point.

The South would

not be able to win the war by the use of military force.
Meade saw the President on October 23,1863,

They agreed

that active operations for the year might as well be ended.
It was undoubtedly on this occasion that Lincoln told Meade
that after Gettysburg the General had reminded him of an old
woman shooing geese across a creek,34
When the Army of the Potomac took up the offensive
again the next spring it would have a new General-in-Chief'
32sallard, p. 171,
331iilliams, p. 268.
34williams, pp. 288-289.
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and at last be on the road to victory.35

35My conjecture.

CRAFTER FOUR
ULYSSES S. GRANT
At the outbreak of the war Ulysses S. Grant was working
as a clerk in a leather store in the mining-boom town of Galena,
Illinois.

Whatever the bleak years that preceded his going to

. work for his father in 1860 had really meant to him, they had
somehow· seasoned him for the job ahead,
In May 1861, Grant was appointed colonel of the 21st.
Illinois infantry.

In August he was made a brigadier general

of volunteers and given command of southeastern Missouri with
headquarters at Cairo.

From the start Grant's policy showed the

agressiveness which marked his whole career.
possession of Paducah, Kentucky.

He at once took

On November 1st he routed

the Confederate garrison at Belmont, Missouri, thus securing
that state for the Union cause.
By the first of February 1862, Grant had conceived the
importance of Forts Henry and Donelson in western Tennessee
and submitted a plan to move upon them.

The plan was finally

approved by General Halleck and on February 6, after a very
minor skirmish, the Confederates abandoned Ft. Henry and marched
the twleve miles overland to Ft. Donelson.

Ten days later, on

February 17, Grant telegraphed General Halleck that Ft. Vonelson
had surrendered with about 14,000 prisoners.

'I'he defenders had

asked for terms, a.nd Grant, with determination that seemed so

41
singularly lacking in other Northern Generals, had replied,

''No

terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted.

I propose to move L11Inediately upon your works. n

North had a new hero in

11

The

Unconditional Surrender" Grant, and

Lincoln looked into the record of this thirty-nine years old
short, stubby, whiskered, unmilitary looking man.l

This double

victory cracked the center of the Confederate line in Kentucky.
(,vith their flanks endangered, the Southern forces had to pull
completely out of Kentucky and part of Tennessee.
Halleck was jubilant, for Grant was under his command
and so Grant's triumph was his triumph.

In relaying the news

to Washington Halleck sue;gested that Grant, as well as Buell
and Pope, be promoted to major general.
In Washington, Lincoln had been looking on with a canny
scrutiny that missed very little; he had his own ideas as to
who should be promoted.

To the Senate Lincoln sent but one

name, that of Ulysses S. Grant to be major general of volunteers.
For after all, Grant, the dull plodder, had been the actual author
of victory at Forts Henry and Donelson.2
After his victories along the Tennessee and Cumberland,
Grant had moved his army up the Tennessee River and encamped
at a place near Shiloh church called Pittsburg Landing, which
was very close to the Mississippi state line.

While awaiting

further orders, his troops were vi3orously attacked by Rebel

lThomas, pp. 306-307.
2Bruce Catton: U.S. Grant and The American Military
Tradition. Little, Brown and Co., Boston. pp. 77-78,
Cited
hereafter as Catton, U.~. Grant.
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al Albert Johnston. Grant and Halleck, in making plans
Gen er
for a move on Corinth, Mississippi, made but one small error.
They very no_ri_chalantly assumed that Johnston and Beauregard
would sit still and wait to be attacked.
The Confederates at Corinth knew if they waited where
they were they would be severely defeated.

Their one hope

was to smite the Yankees before their separate forces were
consolidated into one large fighting unit for a final push into
Mississippi.3
The first day's battle at Shiloh was a serious disaster
to the Union army.

Their position seemed to have been selected

without any special reference to resisting an attack from the
enemy, and they were all but driven from the field.

Although

the army fought most gallantly in various separate encounters,
the day closed with Union forces at the river's edge.

Fortunate-

ly, the advance of Euell's army formed a junction with Grant
late in the afternoon, and that night all of Euell's army
arrived.

During the night the two Generals laid their plans

for an offensive movement early the next morning.

After another

heavy battle the lost field was regained and the Confederates
were broken up and compelled to retreat.

The first reports

from the Shiloh battle field created profound alarm throughout
,the entire country.

It was freely charged that Grant had neg-

lected his command by not digging entrenchments and that the

3catton,
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only reason he was not totally defeated was the timely arrival
of Buell.

Lincoln took official notice of these accusations

and instructed Stanton to ask Halleck whether misconduct on
the part of Grant or any other officer had contributed to the
nurnber of casualties at the battle of Shiloh.

Numerous people

of position requested Lincoln to remove Grant after this near
disaster.

Lincoln quietly replied with the timely comment, "I

can't spare this man; he fights. 11 4
On July 17, 1862, General Halleck left for Washington to
fill the vacancy created when McClellan departed for the Peninsula and gave up the General-in-Chief duties.
In some ways General Halleck was very well suited to be
General-in-Chief in the Civil War.

He was a born gossip and a

politician, and for this, if for no other reason, he readily
understood that the administration's main problems were political
rather than military.

If a Buell had to be sacked and a Ben

Butler had to be retained because of political pressure, Halleck
could understand it and adjust to it, and he would soothe other
generals with chatty, half-indiscreet letters of explanation.5
There was no replacement named for Halleck and the armies
Which he had scattered over all of Tennessee and Kentucky were
no longer under a central command.
Grant at Corinth, Mississippi.

The largest force was under

Thus it was that this moderate

force could do little but sit tight and watch the foe until it

i
4Paul M. Angle: The Lincoln Reader.
s ty Press. New Brunswick. pp. 400-402.
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either received more men or new orders.
Near the end of October Grant sent a suggestion to Halleck.
He requested certain small reinforcements and the authority to
abandon some of the small scattered posts that he was then
holding,

This done, he believed that he could move down the

Mississippi Central Railroad--which ran from Tennessee down
to Jackson, Mississippi, due east of Vicksburg--and force the
Rebels to evacuate Vicksburg.

Halleck wired his approval, and

said that be wanted to see an active campaign on the Mississippi
that fall.6
Grant's operations on Vicksburg began in November 1862.
Advancing directly along the Mississippi Central Railroad
toward Vicksburg, he detached Sherman with part of the force
to proceed down the river to give a flanking movement on
the town.

In the meantime Southern cavalry cut Grant's

communications and caused him to retreat to Corinth.

Sher-

man, obeying orders, attacked the Fort and suffered a defeat.
This was the first of a long series of failures at Vicksburg
for Grant; however, he finally decided upon a brave and
rather bold plan of action.

He took his entire army to the

west bank of the River and marched south of the town and
then recrossed to the east bank and marched north to cut off
Vicksburg from supplies and reinforcements.

This done, all that

· remained to do was to sit and wait them out, for after several
attacks upon the fortifications Grant soon realized that the

6 Catton, U.

s.
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only way they would be beaten was by siegecraft.

4,

lasted from March until July

1863.

The seige

The capture of Vicksburg

and the victory at Gettysburg marked the beginning of the end
for the Rebels. 7
Thirty thousand Southern soldiers surrendered at Vicksburg
and marched off as paroled prisoners of war.

From the President,

Grant received a very warm and personal letter in which was
stated in part that he had been promoted to a major general in
the regular army.
After the fall of Vicksburg, Port Hudson to the south
surrendered, lock stock,. and barrel, on July 9, 1863.

There

were no longer any Confederate troops or fortifications anywhere along the Mississippi River.
The pattern of the conflict was developing just about
as Winfield Scott had thought it might in the dim days before
Bull Run.

What hR.d been accomplished needed no elaboration.

It was the logical conclusion of all that had been done in the
West since the war began.

The Confederacy had been cracked

now and other cracks would follow.

Mr. Lincoln would use super-

lative words to describe Gettysburg, but Vicksburg could be
summed up in one sentence:

"The father of waters rolls

unvexed to the sea. rr8

By the final week in September the picture in the West
had almost completely changed.

The victory of the Southerners

7charnwood, pp. 350-356.
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at Chickamauga threatened to cancel the gains made at Vicksburg.

It was at this time that the Secretary of War, Edwin

Stanton, went to Indianapolis to confer with Grant and appoint
him to command all armies in the West.
Grant went immediately to Chattanooga and replaced Rosecrans with Thomas.
the Rebels.

By late November he was ready to move upon

The battle of Lookout Mountain lasted three days,

and ended in an overwheLuing victory, although it did not go at
all as Grant had planned.
possession.

Eastern Tennessee was now in Union

The second of Lincoln's great strategic objectives

had been achieved, and like the first--the opening of the
Mississippi--achieved by Grant.
Late in February, Congress passed a bill reviving the
rank of lieutenant general and empowered the President to
appoint one officer from the present group of major generals.
Of course everyone knew that it would be Grant, and on March
9,

1864, he was officially commissioned lieutenant general and

given supreme command of the country's armies.9
General Grant was a man of slim figure, only five feet
eight inches in height and slightly stooped.
slight hundred and thirty-five pounds.

He weighed a

He had a certain modesty

and gentleness of manner which seemed to be more befitting the
courtroom than the army camp.
little, he was a good listener.

Like nearly all men who spoke
When not pressed by any matter

of importance he was often slow in his movements, but when

9williarns, pp. 290, 297, 299.
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roused to activity he was q'1ick in every motion, and worked
with marvelous rapidity.
He was civil to all who came in contact with him, and
never attempted to snub anyone, or treat anybody with less
consideration because he held a lesser rank.

He never crit-

icized an officer harshly in the presence of others.

If

criticism was necessary it was never made an occasion to wound
his feelings or humiliate him.
Grant was one of the few soldiers holding high rank who
did not waste his time giving personal attention to petty
,,details.

In the performance of these duties he held his sub-

ordinates to a strict accountability, and kept his time free
for thought.

It was Grant's quiet and intense thinking that

led to the prompt and vigorous actions which were constantly
witnessed during the entire last year of the war.10
Now Grant was the top northern general.

Broadly speaking

he could make his headquarters where he chose and do as he
pleased with the armies of the country, as the War Department
and the White House were pledged to give him their full support.11
'..Jhen he became General-in-Chief, Grant was about as
perfectly trained and formed for the post as any general could
be,

He had under his command no less than seventeen different

commanders and some 533,000 men--no small task for the little
store clerk from Galena.12

10 cornmager, po. 973-976,
11 catton, This Hallowed Ground.
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"A physician on his staff once asked him about the art
of war, expecting a dissertation on Jomini or some other world
authority.

Grant replied that the art of war was really sim-i:ile

enough; at the bottom, it meant to 'find out where your enemy is,
get at him as soon as you can and strike him as hard as you
can, and keep on moving.'

This uncomplicated creed he had

followed ever since Belmont and Fort Henry, and it precisely
expressed the q 1..1ali ty that Abraham Lincoln had been looking
for in his generals for so long a tLne. nlJ
There were no sweeping changes in organization or appointments after Grant's commission.

Halleck was allowed to remain

in Washington in a military capacity which would correspond to
that of the "chief of staff" today.

Meade remained officially

at the head of the Army of the Potomac, issuing orders in accordance with the plans of Grant.

Grant had asked Meade to stay

on, having decided that it might lower morale to have a western
general lead an eastern army.
At first Grant decided to make his headquarters in the
West; at this point Lincoln interfered in military affairs and
requested Grant to stay in the East, pointing out that it was
here that the largest and most powerful Confederate army was
operating under the superb leadership of one General R. E. Lee.
President Lincoln had at long last found his general and
he trusted him almost completely because he believed the General to be a great soldier.

Lincoln approved of Grant's strategy

13catton, This Hallowed Ground.
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and let the general execute it as he saw fit because Grant 1 s
plans were f~ndamentally the sane as those of Lincoln,14
The Army of the Potomac, under General Grant, 122,000
strong on April 30, 1864, was enca...~ped north of the Rapidan
River.

The Rebel army under Lee, numbering 62,000, lay south

of the stream.

The strategy of Grant 1 s campaign against Lee

is simple enough.

His objective was not so much Richmond as

Lee's army; his policy was to ha.mrner away at it until it was
decimated.

Lee's task was to inflict such losses upon him that

he would abandon the oi'.:'ensive or that the North would despair
of victory and turn Lincoln out at the fall elections.

With

almost anyone else Lee's strategy might have worked, but in
Grant he had an opoonent who never knew when he was licked.15
The Army of the Potomac moved down into the tangled
wilderness region below the Rapidan on ~ay h, 1864, trying
to slip past Lee's right flank and force him to fight in the
open country.

Lee sent his troops in and a fantastic battle

boiled for two days.

After a loss of 17,000 men, Grant then

marched south, as if the battle had been won and not lost.
The soldiers were now on the road to the most sustained fighting of the war.16
The Second Battle of the Wilderness was not a defeat
because Grant simply refused to a~~it that he had been beaten.

14williams, pp. JOO, 303, 306, 332.
1 5cornmager, p. 969,
16 catton, Q,
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He kept on moving, and in a direction that would make c~ntinued fighting i:c.evitable.

This was the one great poi.nt he

had stated in his brief philosophy of the strategy of war.17
Hanover Courthouse and Spotsylvania were long-drawn battles
as deadly as anything in military history.

Yet Lee always kept

one step ahead, and the Federal soldiers were forever compelled to attack.

Still Lee could do no more than st2.ve off defeat.

He was forced to fight the kind of war he could not win.

Sooner

or later he would be in a line around Richmond, forced to stand
.seige, and a seige could end only one way.
Cold Harbor was a mistake and showed a lack of finesse on
the part of the commander.

However, Grant had to try to overwhelm

them here, for not to do so would have been an admission that
Lee might possibly hold out long enough to force the North
to come to terms.

There was always the possibility that this

might be the battle that would win the war.
After tbe battle of Cold Harbor, to all appearance, it was
a deadlock.

The Army of the Potomac could no longer sidle to

its left as its left touched the Chickahominy River.

One

more side-slip would put it up against the trenches of Richmond.
However, there was one more move that Grant could make.18
If he could possibly get the Army of the Potomac out of
its trenches witho~t the Southerners being aware of the maneuver they could leave the Cold Harbor sector and march southeast

1 7catton, This Hallowed Ground.

p.

326.

l8catton, This Hallowed Ground.

p.

330.

51
to the

Je1nes

River.

Once across, the army could drive on to the

sme.11 city of Petersburg which lay on the south bank of the
Appomattox rtiver some ten miles due south of Richmond.

However,

all this would be possible only if the engineers could build
a pontoon bridge over a deep stream nearly a half mile wide.
Peters)urg was the place the Confederates had to hold if they
planned to stay in nicbmond.

All but one of the railroads

coming from the South with supplies and ammunition passed through
here.

If Lee meant to stay in Richmond a.nd int he war he

must retain possession of this city.

A blow at Petersburg was

a blow Lee must avoid no matter what it might cost,19
On June

15,

1861.i., Petersburg came under attack and the

seige was about to begin.
of Grant 1 s mind.

It is here that we see the modernity

It is most apparent that his grasp of the

war was becoming total and that the destruction of the enemy's
economic resources was as ef:ective and legitimate a form
of warfare as the destruction of his armies.

By mid-November

1864, General Sherman was ready to flame across Georgia.

And

in February of 1865 Sheridan had cleared the valley of ~ebels
and everything else.

To Lee this economic warfare was need-

less and cruel to civilians.

Leewas the last of the great

old-fashioned generals, Grant the first of the modern.20
Meanwhile there was the situation at Petersburg itself.
Grantts problem was far from si~ple.
was, the North would finally win.

But if there was any way

19catton, This Hallowed Ground.
20williams, pp. 314, 340, 349.
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to strike one hard blow that would end things quickly, that
way had to be tried.

Late in July 1864, it appeared that such

a way might be at hand.
It seems that the 48th regiment from Pennsylvania was
made up largely of men from the coal mining section of that
state.

This regiment held a section of trench and fortifica-

tions opposite a Confederate strong point.
Faced with idleness and boredom, this group presented their
commander, General Burnside, with the idea of digging a mine
tunnel under the trenches to the enemy's side.
upon.

This was agreed

It was felt that the project would at least give them

something to do and keep them busy for awhile, and there was a
slight possibility that i t might work.
The mine tunnel was nearly five hundred feet long.

It

was completed by the end of July and eight tons of powder had
been placed at the end of it, ready to be touched off,
Just at dawn on July 30th the mine blew up and opened
a 150-foot crater where the Rebel strong point had been.

This

gave the Federal army a clear shot at Petersburg.
Trench warfare made offensive movements all but impossible.
However, the explosion of the mine had suddenly restored open
warfare again,

All Burnside's men had to do was to drive through

the opening in order to cut Lee's army in half.

But the chance

was lost completely.
The mine could not have worked better, but the plans for
exploiting it could not have been worse.

Burnside was far to

the rear, looking on from an artillery emplacement, and the
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:Tnion trooDs, instead of marching through to the rear of the
Rebel lines, huddled aimlessly in the crater waiting for new
orders.

This was probably the one chance that was missed during

the Civil War for which there was no excuse.

Grant collliTJ.ented

bitterly that he had never seen such a wide-open opportunity
to overwheL~ an entrenched position.

As a result of a Court

of Inquiry which looked into the .failure of this battle General
Burnside was removed from his command.21
The war in Virginia now took the appearance of a stalemate.

Grant had the Rebels pinned down and there was nothing

to do but wait and extend his lines and improve his .forti.fications.
Little more took place at Petersburg from the battle o.f the
Crater until late February 1865.
As the seige continued in the fall and winter of

1

64- 1 65

Grant was planning and executing his overall strategy for
winning the war in the South.

His Virginia campaign makes

little sense unless viewed as a part of the total picture.
Generals Thomas, Sherman and Sheridan were literally taking
the South apart a piece at a time while Lee and his powerful
army were held at bay by Grant and the Army o.f the Potomac.
Sherman, on his march from Atlanta to the sea, cut the then
remaining South in two, leaving only the south part of Virginia
and the Carolinas still in the Confederacy.

By February 1st

Sherman was ready to head north .from Savannah, Georgia, up

2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground.
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54through ~orth and South Carolina to Virginia to help Grant at
Petersburg and end the war.

He did not quite ma.ke it on time,

as Grant had begun to build up pressure on Lee by mid March.
The break came at the end of March 1865.

Sherman and his

60,000 veterans were far into North Carolina at the time, still
a great distance from Petersburg and Richmond.

In the line

around Petersburg things were moving toward a climax and the last
major ba.ttle of the Civil War--the battle of Five Forks,22
On April 1, 1865, General Grant 1 s army, led by Sheridan 1 s
infantry and cavalry, crashed around Lee's right and stood
astride the last railroad connecting Richmond and the lower
South.

Lee could no longer stay in Petersburg and on April 2nd

evacuated the town, retreating westward toward the small town
of Appomattox, the site of a very historic meeting a week later.
President Lincoln had left Washington on March 23 for City
Point.

His motives for making the trip were numerous, but pri-

marily he wanted to witness the final hour of victory.
On April '3, after the breakthrough, Lincoln boarded the
steamer River Queen for the return trip to Washington,

As he

watched City Point slip away he might have been thinking of the
weary years of defeat--of ~cClellan, ?ope, Burnside, and Hooker--or of the hours of final victory and Grant, Sheridan, and
Sherman.

That day John Wilkes Booth registered at the N"ational

Hotel in Washington,23
22catton, IT. S. Grant. op. 124--127.
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